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Abstract
Foreign direct investment is claimed to positively a⁄ect ￿rms in the host country
through a number of growth-enhancing e⁄ects, generally termed ￿productivity spillovers.￿
However, the empirical evidence for developing economies is quite controversial. This
paper investigates the impact of foreign acquisition on the performances of a sample
of Slovenian manufacturing ￿rms subject to takeover in 1997. The ￿propensity score-
matching￿ estimation technique, also combined with the ￿di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences￿ ap-
proach, is used with the purpose of controlling for the potential bias arising from the non-
random selection of acquired ￿rms. Our analysis con￿rms that foreign investors acquire
only the most productive ￿rms, while ￿nds no convincing evidence that the performances
of such ￿rms improve in the post-acquisition period as a result of foreign acquisition.
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11 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, developing countries have increasingly opened their economies to
foreign direct investment (FDI). Especially, in the 1990s FDI has become the main source
of external ￿nancing for developing economies, largely overshadowing other capital ￿ ows like
o¢ cial development assistance, portfolio ￿ ows and commercial banks loans (UNCTAD, 2004).
Most importantly, the relevance of developing countries as FDI recipients has signi￿cantly
increased compared to the past: according to UNCTAD (2001), the number of developing
countries receiving an annual average of more than $1 billion rose from 6 in the mid-1980s to
23 at the end of the 1990s.
Governments in the emerging markets o⁄er a number of incentives to foreign investors like
reduced income taxes, import duty exemptions and subsidies for infrastructures [see Blomstr￿m
and Kokko (2003) for a discussion on FDI incentives]. By encouraging FDI, these countries
hope to enjoy those bene￿ts extolled by a boundless literature and generally called ￿produc-
tivity spillovers￿[see Blomstr￿m and Kokko (1998)]. These bene￿ts include technology trans-
fer through imitation and labour turnover, e¢ ciency gains spurred by competition and other
growth-enhancing e⁄ects like ￿market access spillovers.￿
Despite the presence of a di⁄used optimism towards the e⁄ects of FDI, empirical evidence
on spillovers is still mixed and sometimes inconclusive. Past studies focus on intra-industry
spillovers, ￿nding a positive correlation between foreign presence and labour productivity in
a given sector [see, for instance, Caves (1974); Globerman (1979); Blomstr￿m and Persson
(1983)]. However, these studies neglect to tackle an important selection problem: FDI may
in fact gravitate towards the most productive sectors rather than being the cause of their
higher productivity. More recent studies on spillovers make use of detailed microdata (￿rm or
plant-level datasets) to control for the di⁄erent attractiveness of the sectors to foreign investors
[see, for example, Haddad and Harrison (1993); Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1995); Aitken
and Harrison (1999)]. These studies ￿nd either the absence of horizontal spillovers from FDI
(that is, spillovers from foreign ￿rms to domestic ￿rms operating in the same sector) or the
existence of negative spillovers, thus casting doubts on the bene￿cial e⁄ects of foreign capital
in developing countries.1 Nonetheless, the selection problem may show up at the ￿rm level:
1According to Aitken and Harrison (1999), for example, a ￿market stealing￿e⁄ect may arise if foreign ￿rms
increase production and monopolise local markets, drawing demand from domestic ￿rms. Other ￿rm-level
studies casting doubts on the presence of FDI-related spillovers are Djankov and Hoekman (2000), and Konings
(2001).
2it is logical to think that foreign investors monitor carefully ￿rms￿performances, and acquire
only the most productive establishments. Neglecting to take this non-random selection process
into account may result in potential bias of the empirical estimates of the impact of foreign
acquisition.
This paper is aimed at measuring the impact of foreign acquisition on the economic per-
formances of a sample of Slovenian manufacturing ￿rms acquired in 1997. The performances
studied, which include total factor productivity (TFP) growth, output growth and employment
growth, are observed in the two years immediately following takeover. The impact of foreign
capital, referred to as the causal e⁄ect of foreign acquisition, is represented by the di⁄erence
between the average performance of acquired ￿rms and the average performance the same ￿rms
would have experienced had they not been acquired. Since the latter is not observable [this is
the so called ￿evaluation problem￿(see Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2002)], we need to infer
it from the observed performance of those ￿rms which remain domestically owned.
In a natural experiment, we could consider acquired ￿rms as those randomly drawn from the
entire population of ￿rms. In this case, the di⁄erence between the average performance of the
acquired ￿rms and that of those staying domestically owned would provide us with the correct
measure of the causal e⁄ect of foreign acquisition. However, the selection problem discussed
above may be plaguing our dataset: the ￿rms acquired in 1997 by foreign investors may in fact
be those presenting higher productivity levels before takeover took place. In this case, using the
available information on domestic ￿rms to estimate the hypothetical performance of acquired
￿rms had they not been acquired may lead to a biased estimation of the causal e⁄ect of foreign
acquisition.
To deal with the selection problem discussed above, we follow the ￿evaluation strategy￿[see
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2002)] and use the ￿matching￿estimation technique [see Heck-
man, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998)]. This technique aims at re-establishing the conditions for
a random experiment by constructing a new sample in which each ￿rm (either acquired or do-
mestic) is a potential target of the foreign investor. It is done by selecting, from the set of ￿rms
staying domestically owned, those ￿rms with the same probability of being acquired by foreign
investors as that of the acquired ￿rms. This probability, called the ￿propensity score￿ [see
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)], is a function of the ￿rms￿observable pre-acquisition character-
istics. These characteristics, which summarise the productivity structure of the ￿rms, hopfully
capture the preference of foreign investors for some ￿rms rather than others. The selected ￿rms
constitute the counterfactual needed to construct the hypothetical performance trajectories of
3acquired ￿rms had they not been acquired, and thus correctly measure the causal e⁄ect of
foreign acquisition. Empirical results are also improved by combining the matching approach
with the ￿di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences￿(DID) estimation technique, as suggested by Blundell and
Costa Dias (2000, 2002).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empirical methodol-
ogy, namely the matching and the combined matching-DID estimation approaches. Section 3
presents the dataset and describes the two samples used in the analysis. Section 4 proceeds to
building the counterfactual group by using the matching technique. Section 5 shows the em-
pirical results from the matching and the combined matching-DID approaches. Finally, section
6 concludes.
2 Empirical methodology
The main issue is the measurement of the impact (the ￿causal e⁄ect￿ ) of foreign acquisition
on the performance (or outcome) y for any ￿rm i in the population of interest. Let us assume
acquisition has taken place at t, and the performance yi;t+s is observed for each ￿rm i in the
post-acquisition period t+s (with s > 0). The causal e⁄ect of foreign acquisition is then given
by
￿i;t+s = y
1
i;t+s ￿ y
0
i;t+s (1)
where y1
i;t+s is the performance observed if ￿rm i is foreign owned at time period t+s, and y0
i;t+s
that if the same is domestically owned. The measurement of ￿i;t+s is obviously complicated
by a missing-data problem, since both the performances cannot be observed simultaneously for
each ￿rm. Hence, following the evaluation strategy [see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997)],
we estimate the causal e⁄ect at the subpopulation level. We thus de￿ne the average e⁄ect of
the treatment on the treated (ATT) as
ATT = E(￿i;t+sjdi = 1) = E
￿
y
1
i;t+s ￿ y
0
i;t+sjdi = 1
￿
(2)
= E
￿
y
1
i;t+sjdi = 1
￿
￿ E
￿
y
0
i;t+sjdi = 1
￿
where di is an indicator of the treatment status, that is, a dummy variable taking value 1 if
￿rm i has been acquired at t, and 0 otherwise. ATT represents the expected impact of foreign
acquisition on a ￿rm from the acquired group.
4The term E
￿
y0
i;t+sjdi = 1
￿
in equation (2) represents the average performance of acquired
￿rms had they not been acquired, which is clearly a hypothetical outcome. Constructing a
valid counterfactual for this term and using it to estimate ATT is the basic concern of the
evaluation strategy. The central issue in our context is whether we can use the average out-
come observed for ￿rms which remained domestically owned, E
￿
y0
i;t+sjdi = 0
￿
, as the required
counterfactual. If our dataset was the result of a pure randomised social experiment, the ￿rms
subject to takeover would be those randomly chosen by foreign investors. In this case, di would
be statistically independent of y0
i;t+s, and thus E(y0
i;t+sjdi = 0) could be used in the place of
E(y0
i;t+sjdi = 1) to estimate ATT.2 Unfortunately, it is unlikely that foreign investors choose
randomly which ￿rms to acquire. As we already discussed, FDI is generally attracted by those
￿rms characterised by higher levels of productivity.
The approach used here to deal with the selection problem is the matching methodol-
ogy, which is aimed at re-establishing the conditions for a random experiment in case non-
experimental datasets are available.3 The key assumption of matching is that the di⁄erences
in the outcomes between acquired ￿rms and ￿rms which remained domestically owned are
captured by a vector of observable pre-acquisition characteristics. Once we control for such
observables, the outcome in the untreated status is independent of program partecipation, and
the di⁄erence in the average outcomes between acquired and domestic ￿rms gives back the
genuine e⁄ect of foreign acquisition.4
The matching approach proceeds by pairing each acquired ￿rm with a domestically-owned
￿rm presenting similar pre-acquisition characteristics, thus re￿ ecting a similar productivity
structure. Since it is almost impossible in practice to match ￿rms on the basis of a number
of covariates higher than one (the ￿curse of dimensionality￿ ), we follow the solution proposed
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), and match ￿rms by using a single index, the ￿propensity
score.￿The propensity score is the probability of a ￿rm being acquired by a foreign investor
conditional on a set of characteristics Xi observed at t ￿ 1:
2In fact, the assumption that di is statistically independent of y0
i;t+s implies that E
￿
y0
i;t+sjdi = 1
￿
=
E
￿
y0
i;t+sjdi = 0
￿
, which means the absence of selection bias.
3Alternative methods to account for the selection problem are the Instrumental Variables estimator and the
Heckman two-step estimator. However, both of them are more demanding on the assumptions at the bottom
of the model.
4This assumption is known as the CIA (Conditional Independence Assumption) and is generally expressed
as (y0
i;t+s ? di)jXi;t￿1. It is also called ￿selection on the observables.￿
5p(Xi;t￿1) = P(di = 1jXi;t￿1) (3)
Matching is practically implemented by pairing each acquired ￿rm i with the domestic ￿rm j
presenting the closest propensity score. In this way, a valid counterfactual (C) for the acquired
group (A) is built by means of the available observations on domestic ￿rms. Hence, ATT is
empirically estimated as the di⁄erence between the mean performance of the acquired ￿rms
and the (weighted) mean performance of those ￿rms included in the counterfactual group:
A^ TTM =
X
i2A
 
yi;t+s ￿
X
j2C
Wijyj;t+s
!
wi (4)
where Wij is the weight placed on the ￿rm j used as the counterfactual for the acquired ￿rm i,
and wi accounts for the reweighting that reconstructs the distribution of the outcome for the
treated sample.5
The matching estimator described above solves the evaluation problem by assuming that
selection is on the observables. However, this solution does not take into account selection on the
unobservables. When longitudinal data are available, we can combine the matching estimator
with the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences (DID) estimator to partially take this problem into account,
as suggested by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). The combined matching-DID estimator is
given by
A^ TT
DID
M =
X
i2A
 
(yi;t+s ￿ yi;t￿n) ￿
X
j2C
Wij (yj;t+s ￿ yj;t￿n)
!
wi (5)
where t ￿ n is a pre-programme period (with t ￿ n < t < t + s).6 This estimator accounts for
unobservable determinants of the selection process as long as they concern ￿rm and time-speci￿c
e⁄ects a⁄ecting the outcomes. Such e⁄ects, in fact, cancel out in sequential di⁄erences.
5In practice, wi is equal to the ratio of one to the number of acquired ￿rms, while the value of Wij depends
on the number of domestic ￿rms we match to each acquired ￿rm. In the ￿single nearest neighbour matching,￿
for example, each acquired ￿rm is matched with one domestic ￿rm, and therefore Wij is equal to one. When the
propensity score of one acquired ￿rm and that of its potential counterfactual are not very similar, matching can
be performed with replacement (that is, one domestic ￿rm is used as the counterfactual for more acquired ￿rms),
in which case Wij is greater than one. In the ￿kernel matching,￿all the domestic ￿rms are used as counterfactuals
for each acquired ￿rm, and Wij is a kernel weight that accounts for the closeness of the propensity score of i to
that of each j.
6In this case, the assumption of conditional independence is stated as (y0
i;t+s￿y0
i;t￿n ? di)jXi;t￿1. Note that
ATTDID
M in (5) measures the causal e⁄ect in period t + s.
63 Data description and construction of the sample
The dataset used here is provided by the William Davidson Institute, Michigan, at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Business School. It consists of a large unbalanced panel (22,466 observations)
of 6,020 Slovenian manufacturing ￿rms observed over the time interval 1994-1999.7 Despite
the availability of such an inclusive dataset, not all the observations in the ￿le can be used,
mainly due to data limitations and to technical issues related to the Olley and Pakes (1996)
methodology used to calculate TFP.8 The ￿nal dataset includes only two types of ￿rms, where
each type is de￿ned according to the ownership status over the interval 1995-1999. According
to this ￿ve year-based criterion, we identify:
￿ Domestic ￿rms (DOMs): ￿rms which stay domestically owned over the interval 1995-1999;
￿ Switching ￿rms (SWs): ￿rms switching status in year 1997 from domestically owned to
foreign owned (that is, domestically owned in 1995 and 1996, acquired by foreigners in
1997, and staying foreign owned in 1998 and 1999).9
We can view these observations as a cross-section of ￿rms in 1997, for which we dispose of
the performances (growth rates of TFP, output and employment) in the two post-acquisition
periods 1998 and 1999 (that is, we set t = 1997 and s = 1;2 in equation (2)). Also, we have
detailed information on some ￿rms￿characteristics for the years 1995 and 1996. This approach
is di⁄erent from other previous works, which carry out the analysis on a panel basis [see, for
example, Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2003); Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003)]. We do not
proceed to a panel analysis due to the strong unbalancedness of the acquisition phenomenon in
Slovenia, which is almost absent in years other than 1997.
7The ￿le consists of statistics mainly drawn from three di⁄erent sources. The o¢ cial ￿nancial records of
the ￿rms provide data on the capital stock, material inputs, and revenues from domestic and foreign sales.
The Slovenian Business Register includes information on the year the ￿rm initiated production and the ￿rm￿ s
ownership structure. Finally, data on the number of employees for each ￿rm come from the Public Pension
Fund.
8Data limitations concern missing values for some variables of interest and the impossibility to retrieve the
2-digit NACE sector for some ￿rms. On the other hand, the Olley and Pakes algorithm requires investment
to be strictly positive, and thus negative values have to be dropped from the dataset. Also, the investment
variable cannot be calculated for 1994, since data on capital assets refers to the stock reported at the end of
the year. More detailed explanations on this methodology can be found in Appendix A.
9A ￿rm is de￿ned as foreign owned if 10% or more of its equity share is owned by a foreign investor. In this
paper, we use the terms ￿acquired ￿rms￿and ￿switching ￿rms￿as synonyms.
7Nonetheless, the use of a ￿ve-year based classi￿cation criterion to de￿ne SWs o⁄ers some
advantages. First of all, we can observe the change in Slovenian ￿rms￿performances for two
consecutive years following acquisition. Since spillovers need time to materialise, observing a
single post-acquisition period may not be enough to capture the real e⁄ects of FDI, leading
to misleading conclusions on the impact of foreign acquisition. Furthermore, in unbalanced
panel data analysis the composition of the group of switching ￿rms changes every year, and
consequently the performance trajectories are built by means of annual averages computed
using di⁄erent ￿rms in each year. This makes di¢ cult to interpret and generalise the empirical
results to all the acquired ￿rms. On the contrary, in our analysis the average performance
trajectories and the post-acquisition e⁄ects are calculated for a ￿xed set of switching ￿rms.
Our classi￿cation criterion has another advantage compared to most of the studies on the
issue, which neglect to consider the history of the ￿rm previous to takeover.10 Attributing
the status of switching ￿rms to only those ￿rms that were domestically owned during the two
years preceding acquisition, we reduce residual in￿ uences, where they exist, of previous foreign
ownerships.11
Although ￿rms are classi￿ed as SWs and DOMs on a ￿ve year-based criterion, not all the
needed information is available for each of the ￿ve years. Many ￿rms de￿ned as SWs present in
fact missing values for some variables in 1995. Hence, in order to exploit at the best our dataset,
we decompose it into two samples, and base the analysis on both of them. The ￿rst sample,
Sample 1 henceforth, contains only those ￿rms with non-missing observations on the variables
in levels (log values) over the interval 1996-1999. This time period is long enough to perform
matching on the pre-acquisition characteristics of each ￿rm (Xi;t￿1 in equation (3)) by means
of a probit estimation, and for calculating the growth rates of variables in two post-acquisition
periods (growth rates for 1998 and 1999). The second sample, Sample 2 henceforth, is obtained
by considering only those ￿rms in Sample 1 for which the variables in levels are also available
for 1995, so that the growth rates for 1996 can be computed, and the combined matching-DID
estimator in equation (5) can be implemented. Table 2 summarises the composition of Sample
1 and Sample 2 by ownership type.
10In fact, whereas Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003) make sure that each ￿rm switches status for the
￿rst time at t, other studies generally consider the acquisition at time t as analogue to a ￿￿rst￿takeover.
11It may happen that some switching ￿rms were foreign owned in 1994. However, the privatisation process in
Slovenia is quite recent a phenomenon. According to Orazem and Vodopivec (2003), the privatisation process
(and so foreign ownership) started to be underway by 1991 for small ￿rms, and began in earnest 1994 for large
state enterprises. Hence, the existence of a previous ownership in 1994 is not expected to a⁄ect signi￿cantly
our results.
8Table 2: Number of ￿rms by ownership type
Ownership type Sample 1 Sample 2
Domestically owned ￿rms (DOMs) 952 678
Switching ￿rms in 1997 (SWs) 28 19
Total 1,005 713
4 Finding the appropriate counterfactual
The ￿rst step to implement the matching technique exposed in section 2 is to calculate the
probability of each Slovenian ￿rm being acquired in 1997 based on some observable character-
istics in 1996. This probability is the propensity score given by equation (3). It is calculated
by means of the following probit model:
P(di;1997=1)=F(TFPi;1996, Exp inti;1996, Agei;1996, Sizei;1996, Ds)
where F is a standard normal cumulative distribution function, and its arguments are some
potential ￿rm-level determinants of foreign acquisition. TFPi is ￿rm￿ s total factor productivity,
which according to the ￿operating e¢ ciency￿theory is positively related to the probability of
acquisition [see McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), and Harris and Robinson (2002)]. Exp inti is
￿rm￿ s export intensity, as measured by the ratio of ￿rm exports to total sales. As reminded by
Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2003), this variable is used by potential investors to infer the level
of a ￿rm￿ s productivity when explicit information on productivity is unobservable or observed
only with error.12 Agei is the di⁄erence between 1996 and the year the ￿rm is established.
Three di⁄erent measures of size (capital assets, the number of employees and the number of
plants) are included in the probit estimation.13 Finally, we use two-digit industry dummies
(Ds) to account for the di⁄erent attractiveness of the sectors to foreign investors.
12Export ￿rms are found to be more productive than non export ones [see Bernard and Jensen (1999); Girma,
Greenaway and Kneller (2002)]. They are also likely to be more similar to foreign acquirers, this implying lower
costs of assimilation in the post-acquisition period.
13Eddey (1991) argues that aggressive corporate raiders may ￿nd large ￿rms attractive, since they would
increase the value of their ￿personal empire.￿On the contrary, according to Palepu (1986), the probability of
a ￿rm being acquired decreases as its size becomes larger. A large size, in fact, entails high transaction costs,
including the cost of integrating the ￿rm into the structure of the acquiring ￿rm.
9Table 3: Probit for the probability of switching in 1997
Variable Sample 1 Sample 2
Coe¢ cient (std. err.) Coe¢ cient (std. err.)
(Log) TFP1996 1.1655*** (0.3989) 2.4320*** (0.7707)
Export intensity1996 1.2783*** (0.3732) 1.0691** (0.4983)
(Log) Age1996 -0.5827*** (0.1830) -0.5477** (0.2184)
(Log) Capital assets1996 0.0288 (0.0873) 0.2264 (0.1576)
(Log) N. of employees1996 0.0420 (0.1109) -0.0557 (0.1720)
(Log) N. of plants1996 0.1014 (0.2243) 0.0143 (0.2479)
Sector dummies Yes Yes
N. of observations 802 494
Pseudo R-squared 0.2045 0.2725
***: signi￿cant at 1%; **: signi￿cant at 5%.
Table 3 shows the results of the probit estimation for both Sample 1 and Sample 2.14 The
results reported in the table con￿rm that foreign investors acquired the most productive ￿rms,
since the coe¢ cients are highly signi￿cant for the variables TFP and Exp int.15 Furthermore,
the age of the ￿rm turns out to be inversely related to the probability of the same being
acquired.16 This result may be explained resorting to the argument that young ￿rms have a
more ￿ exible structure than old ones, and can therefore be more easily (that is, at lower costs)
incorporated in the organisation of the acquiring ￿rm. The variable capital assets, measuring
the size of the ￿rm, is not signi￿cant, and so are the other variables capturing scale e⁄ects
(number of plants or employees). Finally, the probability of changing status from domestic
to foreign owned also depends on the sector in which the ￿rm operates: the coe¢ cients of
the sectorial dummies (not reported) are signi￿cant for manufacturing of chemicals, chemical
products and man-made ￿bres, manufacturing of rubber and plastic products, manufacturing
of transport equipment, manufactoring of electrical and optical equipment and manufacturing
14The results refer to those ￿rms for which the computer package calculated the probability of a positive
outcome. There are 802 ￿rms (774 DOMs and 28 SWs) showing a positive probability in Sample 1, and 494
￿rms (475 DOMs and 19 SWs) in Sample 2.
15Girma and G￿rg (2002) ￿nd that high productivity growth increases the probability of takeover. We tried
to use the growth rates of TFP instead of log(TFP) in the probit estimation, but the variable turned out to be
not signi￿cant.
16The same result has been obtained by Girma and G￿rg (2002), who ￿nd that the probability of takeover
increases for younger and larger (in terms of capital assets) ￿rms, although in a non-linear way.
10of other non-metal mineral products.
Now that we have found the propensity score for each ￿rm, we can proceed to the second
step, which consists of pairing each acquired ￿rm with one (or more) domestic ￿rm(s) with a
similar propensity score. In this way, the counterfactual group C is constructed and used to
recover the causal e⁄ect by means of the estimators presented in equation (4) and (5). Di⁄erent
types of matching estimators can be used for this purpose. Asymptotically, these di⁄erent types
produce the same results, but in small samples the type used can make a di⁄erence.
The nature of the datasets used is crucial in determining the most appropriate version of
the matching estimator. In general, if domestic ￿rms were many compared to acquired ones,
and were also evenly distributed across them, pairing each acquired ￿rm with more than one
domestic ￿rm (multiple matching) would allow for using a richer dataset, thus reducing the
variance of ATT.
Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) show the frequency distributions of the propensity score for domestic
and acquired ￿rms in Sample 1 and Sample 2, respectively.
Figure 2(a): Frequency distribution of the propensity score by
ownership type (Sample 1)
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11Figure 2(b): Frequency distribution of the propensity score by
ownership type (Sample 2)
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It is clear from the graphs that the two samples present an uneven distribution of the
domestic ￿rms across the switching ￿rms. While the acquired ￿rms with propensity scores
close to zero potentially have many comparison ￿rms to be matched with, the number of
domestic ￿rms to use as counterfactuals for each switching ￿rm decreases as the value of the
propensity score gets higher.17 Hence, in order to avoid many bad matches, we prefer using
single nearest neighbour matching rather than multiple nearest neighbour matching.18
The already small number of switching ￿rms to be used in this work is furtherly reduced, due
to the accuracy in the choice of the counterfactuals. Unfortunately, in fact, some acquired ￿rms
17Not only acquired ￿rms with higher propensity scores have very few potential comparison ￿rms to be
matched with. These potential comparison ￿rms also turn out to be poor candidates for the purpose of matching.
In fact, the di⁄erence between the propensity score of each acquired ￿rm and that of its closer counterfactual
tends to increase as the value of the propensity score increases, as we can see from the values of PSdiff and
PSdiff
PSsw in the next Tables 4(a) and 4(b).
18We also have the option to match each acquired ￿rm i with a domestic ￿rm j only if the di⁄erence in their
propensity scores falls within a pre-de￿ned range ￿. This method, called ￿Caliper matching,￿and its ￿Radius
matching￿variant (in which more domestic ￿rms are used as counterfactuals) are also excluded because they
would imply the discretionary imposition of a value of ￿ higher than 0.0062 to exploit a reasonable number of
switching ￿rms. This would allow for extremely bad matches for acquired ￿rms with propensity scores close to
zero (again, see the next Table 4(a) and 4(b)). Estimates obtained with the kernel-based matching have also
been used to exploit better that part of the dataset in which the symmetry of data holds. However, the results
are not reported because they are never statistically signi￿cant.
12do not have a good match with any domestic ￿rm, and therefore we decide to drop them from
the dataset. The matching procedure ￿nds a match for 26 switching ￿rms in Sample 1 and for
13 switching ￿rms in Sample 2. However, since matching has been performed with replacement,
two switching ￿rms have been paired to the same domestic ￿rm in Sample 1. Therefore, the
counterfactal group (COUNTs) in Sample 1 ends up with a total of 25 domestically owned
￿rms.
Table 4(a) and Table 4(b) report the statistics on the propensity score for those ￿rms, in
Sample 1 and Sample 2, respectively, involved in single nearest neighbour matching. In the
￿rst column of each table, switching ￿rms are sorted in descending order by propensity score,
and the correspondent values of their propensity score (PSsw) are shown in the second column.
The third column shows the propensity score for the domestic ￿rm matched with each acquired
￿rm (PScount). In the fourth column, we specify whether the switching ￿rm falls within the
common support region.19 The ￿fth column reports the absolute value of the di⁄erence between
the propensity score of each acquired ￿rm and that of its domestic counterfactual, denoted by
PSdiff. The sixth column shows the ratio of this di⁄erence to the propensity score PSsw. This
ratio, expressed as a percentage, represents the range of variation allowed to the propensity
score of each acquired ￿rm to ￿nd its domestic counterfactual. For example, in Table 4(a)
acquired ￿rm 1 is paired to a domestic ￿rm whose propensity score is 0.95% greater than its
own propensity score.
We can see from the tables that, in terms of the propensity score, we ￿nd a very good
counterfactual for all of the switching ￿rms in Sample 1 and Sample 2. In fact, the value of
PSdiff
PSsw is generally very small, with the highest value being 2.80, which is reasonably low.20
19The common support region is the set of observables simultaneously observed among acquired and domestic
￿rms. The Stata command ￿PSMATCH2￿imposes a common support by dropping the acquired ￿rms whose
propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the domestic ￿rms
[see Leuven and Sianesi (2003)].
20We also performed the test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to calculate the bias reduction
resulting from single nearest neighbour matching for the variables included in the probit estimation. The
results of the test (not reported) con￿rm that the matching process makes the likeness between the two groups
(DOMs and SWs) more marked, reducing the unbalancedness for all the variables except Log (N. of plants).
13Table 4(a): Single nearest neighbour matching (Sample 1)
SW firm
identifier
PSsw PScount On comm.
support
PSdiff
(abs. value)
PSdiff
PSsw
(%)
1 0.0037 0.0038 Yes 0.000035 0.95
2 0.0048 0.0048 Yes 0.000004 0.09
3 0.0093 0.0092 Yes 0.000086 0.92
4 0.0175 0.0175 Yes 0.000011 0.06
5 0.0205 0.0204 Yes 0.000116 0.56
6 0.0210 0.0210 Yes 0.000018 0.09
7 0.0222 0.0221 Yes 0.000099 0.45
8 0.0384 0.0384 Yes 0.000013 0.03
9 0.0439 0.0437 Yes 0.000151 0.34
10 0.0652 0.0657* Yes 0.000522 0.80
11 0.0655 0.0657* Yes 0.000188 0.29
12 0.0710 0.0709 Yes 0.000080 0.11
13 0.0861 0.0854 Yes 0.000618 0.72
14 0.0985 0.0994 Yes 0.000917 0.93
15 0.1142 0.1139 Yes 0.000359 0.31
16 0.1211 0.1214 Yes 0.000258 0.21
17 0.1358 0.1326 Yes 0.003216 2.37
18 0.1510 0.1553 Yes 0.004229 2.80
19 0.1782 0.1791 Yes 0.000908 0.51
20 0.1868 0.1881 Yes 0.001241 0.66
21 0.1919 0.1918 Yes 0.000045 0.02
22 0.2063 0.2055 Yes 0.000825 0.40
23 0.2299 0.2357 Yes 0.005758 2.50
24 0.2950 0.2911 Yes 0.003906 1.32
25 0.3049 0.3111 Yes 0.006171 2.02
26 0.3453 0.3538 Yes 0.008513 2.47
27 0.5191 0.4295 No 0.089629 17.27
28 0.6544 0.4295 No 0.224869 34.36
* The same domestic firm has been matched with two acquired firms
14Table 4(b): Single nearest neighbour matching (Sample 2)
SW firm
identifier
PS sw PS count On comm .
support
PS diff
(abs . val .)
PS diff
PS sw
(%)
1 0.0030 0.0030 Yes 0.000016 0.53
2 0.0046 0.0046 Yes 0.000012 0.26
3 0.0104 0.0104 Yes 0.000042 0.41
4 0.0444 0.0442 Yes 0.000265 0.60
5 0.0746 0.0745 Yes 0.000121 0.16
6 0.0759 0.0761 Yes 0.000141 0.19
7 0.0866 0.0872 Yes 0.000610 0.70
8 0.1059 0.1081 Yes 0.002197 2.07
9 0.1174 0.1176 Yes 0.000156 0.13
10 0.1319 0.1325 Yes 0.000605 0.46
11 0.1366 0.1365 Yes 0.000155 0.11
12 0.1788 0.1740 Yes 0.004715 2.64
13 0.2119 0.2001 Yes 0.011844 5.59
14 0.2490 0.2305 Yes 0.018569 7.45
15 0.3917 0.3440 Yes 0.047699 12.18
16 0.4560 0.4527 No 0.003277 0.72
17 0.4915 0.4527 No 0.038779 7.89
18 0.6816 0.4527 No 0.228871 33.58
19 0.7721 0.4527 No 0.319341 41.36
5 Empirical results
In this section, we summarise the basic results obtained from the matching estimation for
Sample 1 and from the combined matching-DID estimation for Sample 2.21 For what concerns
Sample 1, the only estimate of the causal e⁄ect (A^ TTM) which is statistically signi￿cant relates
to output growth in the second post-acquisition period. A^ TTM calculated in 1999 is in fact
equal to 0.27, with a standard error of 0.12. The causal e⁄ect of foreign takeover is therefore
signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level.
21These results are extensively reported in Appendix B by Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3.
15Figure 3: Average trajectories of TFP, output and employment for the
matched Sample 1
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It means that output growth in 1999 for ￿rms subject to foreign acquisition in 1997 (SWs)
would have been 27% lower if the same ￿rms had not been acquired by foreign investors. Figure
3 shows the average performance trajectories of SWs and those of COUNTs. The latter are
a proxy for the hypothetical trajectories acquired ￿rms would have experienced had they not
been acquired. We have to note that the value of the causal e⁄ect on output growth for 1999
calculated as a simple di⁄erence-in-means (di⁄erence between the average output growth for
SWs and the average output growth for DOMs) is only 6%. Therefore, the presence of selection
bias in our dataset leads to underestimate the causal e⁄ect of foreign acquisition on output
growth by 21%.
The results for Sample 2 show that the only signi￿cant estimate of the causal e⁄ect is
obtained for output growth in 1998. Here, the combined matching-DID estimator (ATT DID
M )
is equal to 0.28, with a standard error of 0.15. Therefore, it is statistically signi￿cant at the
10% signi￿cance level. It means that output growth in 1998 for ￿rms acquired in 1997 (SWs)
would have been 28% lower if the same ￿rms had not been acquired by foreign investors. The
average performance trajectories for the matched Sample 2 are reported in Figure 4.
16Figure 4: Average trajectories of TFP, output and employment for the
matched Sample 2
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In this case, the value of the causal e⁄ect on output growth for 1998 calculated as a simple
di⁄erence-in-means (di⁄erence between the average output growth for SWs and the average
output growth for DOMs) is only 12.3%. Therefore, the presence of selection bias leads to
underestimate the causal e⁄ect of foreign acquisition on output growth by 15.7%.
6 Conclusions
There are good reasons to believe that local ￿rms in developing countries enjoy productivity
spillovers from the presence of FDI [Blomstr￿m and Kokko (1998)]. Nonetheless, empirical
evidence on spillovers casts some doubts on this claim. In fact, using detailed microdata (￿rm
or plant-level datasets), some recent studies ￿nd either the absence of horizontal spillovers from
FDI or the existence of negative spillovers [see Haddad and Harrison (1993); Aitken, Harrison
and Lipsey (1995); Aitken and Harrison (1999); Djankov and Hoekman (2000); Konings (2001)].
The sore point of these studies is related to the possibility that empirical results are plagued
by a selection problem. FDI is in fact expected to be attracted by the most productive ￿rms
17or plants, this biasing the estimates of the impact of FDI.
This paper uses ￿rm-level data on Slovenian manufacturing ￿rms with the purpose of mea-
suring the causal e⁄ect of foreign acquisition on the performances of those ￿rms subject to
takeover in 1997. We control for the non-random selection of domestic ￿rms by foreign in-
vestors following the ￿evaluation literature.￿Speci￿cally, we employ the ￿matching￿and the
￿di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences￿estimators suggested by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998)
and Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2002), respectively.
Our ￿ndings con￿rmthat foreign investors are likely to acquire the most productive Slovenian
￿rms, that is, those with higher values of TFP and export propensity. With regard to the causal
e⁄ect of foreign acquisition, we ￿nd that it is statistically signi￿cant for output growth in 1998
and 1999. Particularly, output growth in 1998 for ￿rms subject to foreign acquisition in 1997
would have been 28% lower if the same ￿rms had not been acquired by foreign investors. In
1999, the causal e⁄ect amounts to 27%. However, the impact of foreign acquisition is not statis-
tically signi￿cant for TFP growth and employment growth in the two years following takeover.
Hence, our analysis does not lend a strong support to the argument that FDI is bene￿cial to
the host developing countries￿economic growth through productivity-enhancing e⁄ects.
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21Appendix A - TFP calculation
We estimate ￿rm￿ s productivity following the methodology developed by Olley and Pakes
(1996). This is a semiparametric estimation approach that solves the simultaneity bias problem
(endogeneity of input demand) without having to rely on instrumental variables (IV).22 Hence,
it turns out to be a useful tool in the case good instruments are not available.
The simultaneity problem can be explained as follows. Let us assume that each industry
produces a homogeneous product with a Cobb-Douglas technology. The production function
has the form
Yit = AitL
￿l
it K
￿k
it M
￿m
it (A.1)
where Yit represents the output (real sales), Lit is the labour input (number of employees in the
￿rm), Kit the real value of capital assets, Mit the real value of material inputs, and Ait is the
total factor productivity (TFP), known in the economic literature as the Solow residual. The
subscript i indexes ￿rm, while t indexes time. Taking the logarithms of both sides of equation
(A.1), we obtain:
logYit = logAit + ￿l logLit + ￿k logKit + ￿m logMit (A.2)
Equation (A.2) can be easily estimated by
yit = ￿0 + ￿llit + ￿kkit + ￿mmit + uit (A.3)
where the lower-case letters are used for logarithms, and logAit has been decomposed into
a constant, ￿0, and an error term, uit. The simultaneity problem is that during the current
year at least a part of the TFP, say a part of uit in (A.3), can be observed by the ￿rm early
enough to modify its decision on the amount of inputs to use for producing output. For
example, more productive ￿rms will probably demand more labour to increase production.
This positive correlation between labour and productivity will lead to upward-biased coe¢ cients
on labour when estimating the above equation by OLS.23 Basically, ￿rms which face a large
22The Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology also allows to control for the bias due to selection. Althought
selection is an important aspect characterising transition process of Slovenian ￿rms (less productive ￿rms are
replaced by those with higher productivity), we cannot use this option due to the impossibility to distinguish
between ￿rms exiting the dataset because of liquidation or due to the fact that they have not been surveyed in
a given year.
23See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) on the bias in the coe¢ cient estimates of the production function.
22productivity shock may respond by increasing the amount of inputs, which would yield upward-
biased estimates of the variable input coe¢ cients and consequently would produce a biased
measure of the TFP.24
At the beginning of each period the ￿rm chooses the amount of variable factors to use and
the level of investment to carry out. Together with the current capital, the latter determine
the capital stock at the beginning of the next period. Hence, the capital law of motion is given
by
Ki;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kit + Iit (A.4)
where Iit is the level of investment at the beginning of period t, and ￿ is capital depreciation
rate.25
Therefore, each ￿rm modi￿es its input demand according to the level of the observed pro-
ductivity (hereafter !it). Consequently, equation (A.3) can be rewritten as
yit = ￿0 + ￿llit + ￿kkit + ￿mmit + !it + eit (A.5)
where uit has been disaggregated into two elements: !it, representing that part of productivity
observed by ￿rm i at time t (but not observable by the econometrician), and eit, an i.i.d.
component which may denote measurement error or a productivity shock not forecastable
during the period in which labor can be adjusted. The important di⁄erence between the two
terms is that the former is a state variable in the decision problem of the ￿ms. Hence, it a⁄ects
input demand, while the latter does not.
Several solutions to the simultaneity bias problem have been proposed by the recent em-
pirical literature. A simple way to get rid of the bias generated by the correlation between !it
and the inputs is to assume that the productivity shock is ￿rm-speci￿c and invariant over time,
that is, !it = !i. The ￿xed-e⁄ect (FE) transformation will then lead to consistent estimates
of the parameters. However, the FE estimator can be criticised in that it uses only the across
time variation, which is generally much lower than the cross section one. Also, the underlying
24In the present context, labour and materials are considered as variable factors, meaning that they can be
in￿ uenced by the current value of !it. On the other hand, capital is considered as a ￿xed factor, in the sense
that it can only be a⁄ected by the distribution of !it conditional on information at time t ￿ 1 and past values
of !it.
25The depreciation rate in Slovenian manufactoring generally varies between 10 and 15 % according to the
sector of interest [see De Loecker and Konings (2004)]. Due to the impossibility to individuate a speci￿c rate for
each sector, we use an average value of 12,5 % for all the industries, which seems to be a good approximation.
This average rate has been used to obtain the values for investment by equation (A.4).
23assumption that productivity is time-invariant is often considered unrealistic.
Mainly due to this reason, and to di¢ culties in ￿nding good instruments to solve the si-
multaneity problem with the IV procedure, the use of the semiparametric estimation method
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) is gaining popularity. The insight of this method is that
the unobserved component of TFP can be modelled as a function of some observed variables.
More exactly, the authors assume that the investment decision can be formalised as a function
of productivity and capital:
iit = iit(!it;kit) (A.6)
Provided that investment is a monotonically increasing function in its arguments, we can
invert the investment decision given by (A.6).26 Therefore, the unobservable productivity can
be expressed as a function of two observables, namely capital and investment:
!it = hit(iit;kit) (A.7)
Using (A.7), equation (A.5) can be rewritten as
yit = ￿0 + ￿llit + ￿kkit + ￿mmit + hit(iit;kit) + eit (A.8)
which is the equation to be estimated in the ￿rst stage of the procedure. Since hit(iit;kit) is an
unknown function, the coe¢ cient on capital cannot be estimated at this stage.
Now let us de￿ne
￿it(iit;kit) = ￿0 + hit(iit;kit) + ￿kkit (A.9)
Using (A.9), equation (A.8) can be rewritten as
yit = ￿llit + ￿mmit + ￿it(iit;kit) + eit (A.10)
We estimate equation (A.10) by means of a partially linear model, using a third-order
polynomial expansion in log-investment and log-capital to approximate the unknown function
￿it(iit;kit).27 Hence, we can obtain consistent estimates for the free inputs, namely labour and
26Pakes (1994, Theorem 27) shows that monotonicity of iit holds only if investment is strictly positive, that
is i > 0. Hence, all the data on investment which present a negative sign or that are equal to zero have to be
dropped from the database. This implies a drastic reduction in the number of observations.
27The polynomial expansion is given by: ￿it(iit;kit) =
3 X
q=0
3￿q X
s=0
￿qsk
q
itis
it
24materials, respectively given by ^ ￿l and ^ ￿m. We can also obtain the estimate of the polynomial
expansion, ￿it, in the following way:
^ ￿it = yit ￿ ^ ￿llit ￿ ^ ￿mmit ￿ ^ eit (A.11)
This expression will turn out to be useful later on. Now we have to consider the expectation
of yi;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿lli;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿mmi;t+1, given by
E[yi;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿lli;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿mmi;t+1jki;t+1] = (A.12)
= ￿0 + ￿kki;t+1 + E[!i;t+1j!i;t]
= ￿kki;t+1 + g(!it)
Assuming that !i;t is serially correlated, we can write !i;t+1 as a function of !i;t, with ￿i;t+1
being the innovation at time t + 1.28 Replacing !it with the expression for ht(iit;kit) that we
obtain from equation (A.8), we have
yi;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿lli;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿mmi;t+1 = ￿kki;t+1 + g(￿it(iit;kit) ￿ ￿kki;t) + ￿i;t+1 + ￿i;t+1 (A.13)
The unknown function g(￿it￿￿kki;t) in (A.13) can be approximated by a third order polynomial
expansion in (^ ￿it ￿ ￿kki;t), where ^ ￿it is given by (A.11). Hence, we can write equation (A.12)
as follows:
yi;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿lli;t+1 ￿ ^ ￿mmi;t+1 = ￿kki;t+1 +
3 X
r=0
￿r(^ ￿it ￿ ￿kki;t)
r + ei;t (A.14)
Equation (A.14) constitutes the second stage of the Olley and Pakes procedure, allowing to
obtain a consistent estimate of the coe¢ cient on capital, ^ ￿k. The above equation is estimated
by nonlinear least squares.
Finally, once we have consistently estimated all input coe¢ cients of the production function,
the term logAit in (A.2) capturing ￿rm productivity can be residually calculated as
log(TFP) = yit ￿ ^ ￿llit ￿ ^ ￿mmit ￿ ^ ￿kkit
28The function g(!it) in Equation (A.12) has a complex representation. For a better understanding of the
mathematical passages, see Olley and Pakes (1996).
25Appendix B - Results from matching and DID estimation
Table B.1: Post-acquisition e⁄ects of foreign takeover (Sample 1)
matching estimates (A^ TTM) for 1998 and 1999
Growth rate 1998 1999
Group SWs COUNTs SWs COUNTs
N. of observations 26 25 26 25
TFP growth Mean 0.0156 -0.0141 0.0191 -0.0652
A^ TTM 0.0297 0.0843
(Std. err.)x (0.0582) (0.0674)
Output growth Mean 0.1844 0.0353 0.0862 -0.1882
A^ TTM 0.1491 0.2744**
(Std. err.)x (0.1503) (0.1182)
Empl. growth Mean 0.1383 0.0995 -0.0390 0.0090
A^ TTM 0.0388 -0.0481
(Std. err.)x (0.0825) (0.1185)
x Standard errors are calculated by means of bootstrapping technique (200 replications);
** ATT is signi￿cant at 5%.
26Table B.2: Post-acquisition e⁄ects of foreign takeover (Sample 2)
combined matching - DID estimates (A^ TT DID
M ) for 1999
Growth rate 1999 1996
Group SWs COUNTs SWs COUNTs
N. of observations 13 13 13 13
TFP growth Mean -0.0010 -0.0265 0.0696 0.0898
A^ TTM 0.0255 -0.0202
(Std. err.)x (0.0415) -
A^ TT DID
M 0.0457
(Std. err.)x (0.0580)
Output growth Mean 0.1373 0.0580 0.0376 0.1539
A^ TTM 0.0793 -0.1164
(Std. err.)x (0.1313) -
A^ TT DID
M 0.1957
(Std. err.)x (0.1675)
Empl. growth Mean 0.0248 -0.0201 -0.0092 -0.0001
A^ TTM 0.0449 -0.0091
(Std. err.)x (0.0575) -
A^ TT DID
M 0.0541
(Std. err.)x (0.0919)
x Standard errors are calculated by means of bootstrapping technique (200 replications).
27Table B.3: Post-acquisition e⁄ects of foreign takeover for Sample 2
combined matching - DID estimates (A^ TT DID
M ) for 1998
Growth rate 1998 1996
Group SWs COUNTs SWs COUNTs
N. of observations 13 13 13 13
TFP growth Mean 0.0291 0.0317 0.0696 0.0898
A^ TTM -0.0026 -0.0202
(Std. err.)x (0.0536) -
A^ TT DID
M 0.0176
(Std. err.)x (0.0729)
Output growth Mean 0.1272 -0.0360 0.0376 0.1539
A^ TTM 0.1632 -0.1164
(Std. err.)x (0.1296) -
A^ TT DID
M 0.2795*
(Std. err.)x (0.1534)
Empl. growth Mean 0.0452 0.0368 -0.0092 -0.0001
A^ TTM 0.0085 -0.0091
(Std. err.)x (0.0591) -
A^ TT DID
M 0.0176
(Std. err.)x (0.1375)
x Standard errors are calculated by means of bootstrapping technique (200 replications);
* ATT is signi￿cant at 10%.
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